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pAbstract
Today, Europe is a continent of low participation, low employment labor markets.
Many observers would like to blame poor employment outcomes on the Euro or on
austerity. But these are dangerous distractions from real problems that constitute
imperatives for structural reform. There are differences across countries, but there is a
“European model” of work: almost every European economy has more stringent
employment protection and more generous social benefits than peers in North
America, Oceania, and East Asia. This has led to low labor force participation and
high unemployment, especially among young Europeans. Layered on top of these
weak labor markets is the rapid onset of aging; if policies are not changed, Europe
will lose about a million workers every year for the next five decades, especially in
the 2030s. In short, Europe has to increase both the demand for and supply of labor.
To do so, Europeans have to begin viewing competition as a necessary good, not an
unnecessary evil. Restructuring unemployment and pension benefits will help to
increase participation and reverse the decline of the workforce, but policies that
promote competition for jobs and mobility of job-seekers are needed to increase the
demand for labor. To get to full employment, Europe has to alter the employment
protection laws that give too much power to those with jobs while marginalizing
others to the fringes of the economy. Europeans will have to reduce and restructure
the generous social benefits that simultaneously discourage young people from
searching seriously for work and encourage older workers to quit work too early.
Europeans will have to view mobility of workers as a prerequisite of European
integration, not just a possible consequence of it. If all this is augmented by reforms
to reduce public debt, encourage enterprise and innovation, and stabilize finance,
Europe will have a vibrant economy, with high participation and full employment.
Jel codes: I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs,
J08 - Labor Economics Policies, J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and
Structure, J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity,
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions, J42 - Monopsony;
Segmented Labor Markets
Keywords: European labor markets; Segmented labor markets; Employment
protection; Social benefits; Labor mobility1 Introduction
In February 2000, the world watched as France instituted the 35-hour workweek, down
from the 39 hours expected of French workers, and the over 40 in most developed
countries. The reasoning was that because there are only so many hours of work
needed, it would be better to share them among more workers. Unemployment in late
1999 was about 10 percent, so cutting the number of hours by about 10 percent mightGill et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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son was the belief that French workers should be rewarded for their high productivity
by allowing them to work less. Researchers found that the output per hour worked was
higher in France than in almost every other country. Getting employers to pay overtime
wages for work beyond 35 hours would help labor capture more benefits of high
productivity.
What happened over the next few years? Unemployment did not fall by much,
though the new requirements might have encouraged workers to move to smaller firms
that were not covered by the law (Estevão and Sá 2008). The 35-hour workweek has
since been watered down, but no government has tried to repeal it. Instead, businesses
have been given ways around the problem, and the regulations have become more
complicated. In the meantime, productivity growth has slowed in Western Europe and
sped up in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, output per hour worked in
manufacturing—the sector with the most reliable data—grew at roughly 4 percent a
year in both France and the United States. Between 2000 and 2007, it accelerated to 6
percent in the United States, while French productivity growth slowed to 3.3 percent
(United States Department of Labor 2011).
Although institutions and social norms vary across Europe, the stereotype is that
Americans “live to work” and Europeans “work to live”. Few would argue that the two
weeks of leave that many workers in the United States get is good for their productivity
and growth. Americans who have traveled or lived in Europe often lament the imbal-
ance between work and life in the United States, and attribute the rise in stress and
tensions in family life to the importance Americans give to work. One could be for-
given for wondering whether in the years since Europe’s “Golden Age” between 1950
and 1970, Europeans have been drifting to the opposite but equally questionable ex-
treme. In the 1960s, the French worked the longest hours among advanced countries.
By the 1980s, they worked about as long as Americans. By 2000, they worked about
300 fewer hours each year—a month and a half less—than Americans. In France, just 1
in 10 people aged 60–65 works; in the United States, the ratio is 1 in 2. It is difficult to
see how norms can change so quickly; the reason has to be that policies have changed.
If Europeans feel that work has declined too much, then it is obvious that policies have
to change.
One development makes these decisions urgent. As people reduce the years they
work in most of Europe, populations in all European countries are aging. The European
Union’s labor force is expected to decline by about 39 million by 2060. If the Balkans,
Turkey, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus are included, the decline is about
50 million; the projected increase of 6 million in Turkey’s labor force is more than off-
set by the decline elsewhere. Only if actual retirement ages were to increase by around
10 years and participation rates—especially among women—were to increase to levels
seen in Northern Europe, could Europe offset the decline in the labor force. None of
these measures, though, would prevent the aging of the European labor force.
Europe is not alone in feeling the force of aging. Japan and other developed parts of
Northeast Asia already find themselves under the strains of low fertility and increasing
longevity. In the Southern Cone of Latin America, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are
also getting old. Even China faces this challenge, and indeed will from 2015 experience
faster aging than any country has experienced previously. But the most “European”
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employed, and easy pension eligibility—make the imperatives created by an aging popu-
lation most acute in Europe.
Europeans have a choice: work more to maintain the European social model, or give
up a big part of this model through painful cuts in social benefits. The first imperative
is to counter shrinking of the labor force. As in now-wealthy Western Europe, North
America, and Japan, industrialization, urbanization, and advances in hygiene and health
care extended lifespan and reduced child mortality and the need for large families. Yet
with legal retirement age stuck at 60 or 65 in most countries, and many people retiring
even younger, the number of people at work has been falling. The labor force in Europe
as a whole is expected to shrink 5 percent by 2020 and more than 15 percent by 2060.
The second imperative is to increase labor productivity. A shrinking labor force rein-
forces the need to develop human capital relevant in the labor market. With increasing
shortages of qualified labor and rapidly changing industrial structures, any inclusive
growth strategy will need to boost labor productivity through investments in human
capital. Europe’s adverse demography also means that its human capital has to be better
leveraged. Labor market regulations, interventions, and institutions have to become
more “pro-work”. To ease the brakes on growth caused by aging, it is necessary to have
labor market regulations that encourage more people to work, to work longer, and to
work more productively. Changes that make jobs more contestable will increase prod-
uctivity. And increasing the productivity of the labor force will require that Europeans
become more mobile. In short, Europe will have to rid itself of the lump-of-labor fal-
lacy that impedes smarter labor policy1.
What has to be done? First, Europe must offset the impending labor force decline by
increasing the labor force participation of people of all ages. Second, European coun-
tries must improve regulations and interventions so that labor is allocated more effi-
ciently, within and across countries. And third, Europeans will have to change their
attitude to labor mobility. We arrive at these conclusions by answering three questions:
 Are employment and social protection practices reducing participation? In most
parts of Europe, they are. Strict employment protection and weak work incentives
undermine labor participation and efficiency in Europe. Some governments have
reformed labor laws to make hiring new workers cheaper—though these changes
have generally been piecemeal, as in Spain during the early 2000s—while others
such as Germany have restructured social assistance schemes to make it more
profitable to work rather than collect benefits. Central European countries such as
Poland have changed social security systems to encourage participants to work
longer, but it is far from clear whether these changes will be sustained.
 Are employment and social protection policies inhibiting efficiency? In almost all of
Europe, they are. Current policies allow “insiders” to make their jobs incontestable
through strict employment protection, while creating considerable work
disincentives for “outsiders” through poorly designed social benefits, especially in
low-wage segments. Many governments in Europe—especially in the north—have
been making the labor market more contestable, and others can learn from them.
 Is Europe taking advantage of the potential for greater labor mobility? The short
answer is no. Although migration between EU countries is higher than in other
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labor market. In addition, internal labor mobility in most countries is low. The
explanations (beside the obvious difference in language and culture between EU
countries) involve inefficient housing markets, wage-setting practices that do not
signal labor shortages and surpluses, and the absence of a Europe-wide social safety
net that makes moving too risky.
Many observers would like to blame Europe’s poor employment outcomes on the
Euro or on austerity. But these are dangerous distractions from real problems that con-
stitute imperatives for structural reform. What of employment and the Euro? Of the 27
member states of the European Union in March 2013, 17 use the single currency, four
peg their own national currencies to the Euro, and six retain freely floating national
currencies. Although the five EU countries with the highest unemployment are all Euro
members (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus), four of the five countries with
the lowest unemployment rates (Austria, Luxemburg, Germany, and the Netherlands)
use the single currency as well (the fifth is Romania). What about employment and aus-
terity? This is a bit of a red herring. Greece’s public spending in 2013 will be what it
spent in 2002, Portugal and Italy in 2005, and Spain in 2008. The UK, France and the
Netherlands have been spending a lot more. So while the headwinds on growth and de-
mand for employment created by tighter fiscal policy cannot be ignored, nor should
they distract policy makers from structural problems.
Europe is aging and its labor force shrinking. This is not news. But the speed and size of
these developments is shocking, and should motivate policy responses. Labor market reg-
ulations, interventions, and institutions are restraining growth, and they must be updated.
Education and training systems will need reform to enable workers to take up more pro-
ductive jobs, with greater ease and to greater profit. Europeans are still less likely to move
than people in other parts of the world, and the success of the single market in services
depends on their becoming more mobile. To do all this, Europe’s policymakers will have
to convince themselves and their constituents that the rewards of hard work can be
shared sensibly without treating labor as a fixed lump to be parceled out.2 More—and more productive—work
Workers in Europe benefit from the most effective protection against abuse by employers
and the most comprehensive job security and nonwage benefits, such as unemployment
insurance, paid leave, and retirement pensions, which sustain shorter work hours than in
most of the developed world. In many ways, these characteristics set Europe apart from
other regions and are a triumph of economic development and liberal democracy. But
given changes in Europe and the rest of the world since the end of the continent’s “Golden
Age” between 1950 and the mid-1970s, and the speed of global economic integration
since, many features of the European work model are coming under pressure. These chal-
lenges are exacerbated by a shrinking and aging labor force.2.1 The decline of work
People in many countries are working less than they used to. As countries have grown
richer, people have consumed more leisure, and the average number of hours worked
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this reduction in hours worked is matched by gains in productivity—the output of the
average worker—the decline should be expected and treated as healthy, as in Ireland,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Yet the speed of the decline in hours worked in
France, Italy, and Spain since 1995 raises concern when juxtaposed with their modest
gains in labor productivity during the last two decades (Figure 2).
Several countries in Europe hold the dubious distinction of having among the lowest
rates of labor participation in the world. This is a feature that marks both high- and
middle-income countries in the region. The percentage of working-age people who par-
ticipate in the labor market has fallen at a faster pace in several large European economies
than in other member countries of the OECD (Figure 3). In Europe’s southern periphery,
a rare coincidence threatens future prosperity: women have low participation rates and
low fertility, adding less to both today’s economic output and tomorrow’s.
Europeans have also been withdrawing from the labor market to retire at a much
earlier age than previously (Figure 4). In France and Spain, for example, the effective
age of retirement of men has fallen about twice as much as it has in Canada, Japan,
and the United States. With the notable exception of the Czech Republic and Germany,
where workers are staying active a bit longer than they used to, the trend in Europe is
toward earlier retirement, despite efforts of governments in many countries to make
qualifying for pensions more difficult. This contrasts with the gentler decline in the effect-
ive retirement age of workers in the United States, and sharply with the relative stability
in the age of retirement in high-income East Asian countries. Men in the Republic of
Korea, for example, are actually working almost six years longer than they were in 1965.
2.2 The decline of populations
Europe—the EU, EFTA, EU candidate countries, and the EU eastern partnership—will









































































Figure 1 The decline in hours worked was faster in Europe than elsewhere in the OECD. (reported
average hours worked per year, percentage point difference 1990–2008, 1990 = 100). Source: World Bank




















































































Figure 2 Europe has both productivity leaders and laggards. (GDP per hour of work, percentage point
difference 1990–2008, 1990 = 100). Source: World Bank estimates, using International Labour Organization data.
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down to 275 million, a decrease of 15 percent. Over the next 20 years, the labor force
will decrease by 15 million (5 percent). Younger workers—below the age of 40—will
shrink substantially during the 2020s. After 2030, the decline of the European labor
force will happen among workers over 40 and gradually slow down. The largest crunch
will happen during the 2030s: in that decade alone, the European labor force will fall













































































Figure 3 The decline in work participation has been faster in Europe. (change in the labor force
participation of men ages 15–65, percentage point difference 1980–2008). Source: World Bank estimates,


























































































Figure 4 Europeans are retiring at earlier ages than they used to. (change in the average effective
retirement age of men, number of years difference 1965–2007). Source: World Bank estimates, using OECD data.
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ation that was born between 1945 and 1960 began retiring in 2005. The largest popula-
tion cohort “Generation X,” born between 1960 and 1970, will approach retirement age
over the next 15 years. Generation X will start to retire in the 2020s, but thereafter,
ever-smaller cohorts of young people will follow, pushing what experts call the “old-age
dependency ratio” rapidly downward, so that by 2050 in some European countries there
will only be two people working for every person receiving retirement pensions.
The decrease in labor force participation varies considerably across European coun-
tries. The main reason is that fertility rates in Europe range from around 1.2 to 1.5 in
the Eastern, Central, and Southern European countries, to 1.6 to 2.0 in the Benelux
and Northern European countries. This is lower than the demographic replacement
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Figure 5 The big reduction in the number of workers aged 15–39 will happen before 2030.
(projected changes in labor force, by age group and period, millions). Source: World Bank estimates, using
methodology described in Koettl (2009) and data from United Nations (2010).
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Their labor force will decrease by 39 million people (18 percent) over the next 50 years.
The other eastern European countries do not fare much better, with an equally steep
decline of 16 percent. The only exception is Turkey, where the labor force is projected
to increase 12 percent until 2060.
The natural consequence of falling fertility and rising longevity is an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio—the number of people older than 65 relative to those of
working age (15–65). By 2050, this ratio will double to about 50 percent in Europe, with
Spain (68), Italy (66), and Portugal (58) projected to have the highest ratios (Muenz 2007).
The projected changes in Europe—especially Southern and Eastern Europe—contrast
with trends south of the Mediterranean, where the population is still fairly young.
2.3 Improving Europe’s demographic arithmetic
Can Europe mitigate these trends? Only with radical policy and behavioral changes. If
participation rates in all countries were to converge to those seen in Northern Europe
or if work lives were to expand by 10 years across the board, the European labor force
would actually increase by 2060 (by 5 percent and 2 percent, respectively; Figure 6). If
female labor force participation were to converge to that of men, the labor force would
still decrease, but only by 5 percent, as opposed to 15 percent in the baseline scenario.
None of these scenarios counteracts the loss of young workers due to continually de-
creasing younger-age cohorts. Under all four scenarios—including the combined max-
imum scenario—the labor force below age 40 will shrink. In other words, the only large
pool of potential additional workers—apart from new immigrants—that Europe could
draw from in the future is among the elderly (ages 65 and older).
Given the low participation rates in many European countries—especially among
women, youth, the elderly, and excluded groups—there is room to improve and to stem
some of the decline of the European labor force. To encourage people to participate,
incentives for work must be aligned to ensure that work pays for both the employee
and the employer. This could require, among other policy reforms, significant changes


































Figure 6 To keep the size of the labor force stable, Europeans have to work longer. (change in
European labor force between 2010 and 2060 by scenario and age group in millions). Source: World Bank
estimates, using methodology described in Koettl (2009) and data from United Nations (2010).
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increasingly more educated—more than men among younger cohorts—they represent a
large pool of untapped talent. Even if their entry into the market in larger numbers
does not produce the payoff in additional workers that comes from increasing the re-
tirement age, it could have a large productivity payoff. Increasing female labor force
participation would require interventions that allow women to better juggle multiple roles
by providing, for example, child care facilities and flexible work arrangements (World
Bank 2010b). The latter might also play an important role for keeping elderly workers in
the labor force by allowing them to phase in retirement on a part-time basis.
To increase labor force participation across the board, both employees and employers
need the right incentives for work. Currently, it seems that disincentives for (formal)
work are substantial in many European countries, especially for low-productivity
workers. For example, Koettl (2013) and Koettl and Weber (2013) show that when
comparing formal jobs with informal jobs, the benefits of formal jobs would have to be
quite large to offset their costs in terms of taxes, social security contributions, and
withdrawn social benefits. A similar result might hold for a comparison between formal
jobs and inactivity. This leads to the conclusion that formal (part-time) jobs at low
wage levels may not be an economically viable option for low-productivity job seekers
in many European countries. For employers, high labor taxation has similar implica-
tions as it increases the total costs of labor and makes it less attractive to hire. Analysis
using EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions data suggests that there is a nega-
tive correlation between the incidence of formal employment and work disincentives at
the individual level (Koettl and Weber 2013).
Two main levers can make (formal) work pay for low-productivity workers and their
employers: decreasing the labor tax wedge at lower wage levels and “smoothing” incen-
tives with changes to social assistance, housing, and family benefits. Regarding the tax
wedge, current social protection financing in several countries discriminates against
lower earners. Options for reducing the labor tax wedge include incentives linked to
wage subsidies, social insurance contribution credits, or so-called “in-work” or
employment-conditional benefits—cash benefits or refundable income tax credits con-
ditional on formal employment—for low-wage earners. With regard to the design of so-
cial assistance, housing, and family benefits, the key is to keep the marginal effective
tax rate in mind when designing eligibility conditions and how benefits are withdrawn.
The goal is to reform these benefits toward so-called “smart safety nets,” making social
protection benefits more compatible with work. In particular, any additional wage
should also increase beneficiaries’ net incomes, including benefits. Otherwise, add-
itional work does not pay, and beneficiaries will prefer to not work at all, to work infor-
mally, or to underreport their earnings3.
2.4 Developing the skills to work to potential
Recent studies from the OECD spotlight the importance of skills—cognitive, socioemo-
tional, technical—in determining productivity. For example, Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008) have shown that cognitive skills (proxied by Program for International Student
Assessment scores) explain a sizeable part of the variation in growth rates observed in
OECD countries, including Western Europe4. In fact, the evidence suggests that generic
skills also have substantial growth payoffs, even in advanced economies. Unsurprisingly,
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as reflected in the European Union’s growth strategies (Lisbon Agenda, Europe 2020)
and numerous strategic and policy documents (European Commission 2010a; World
Bank 2011a).
Skills include not only technical ability, but also generic cognitive skills (literacy, nu-
meracy, problem solving) and generic noncognitive skills (socioemotional and behav-
ioral attributes such as team work, self-discipline, and perseverance). A solid base of
generic skills seems to be a prerequisite for further acquisition of technical skills,
whether through post-secondary education or on the job5. Further, the foundation for
the development of generic skills is built early in life and during adolescence and hinge
on having access to adequate nutrition, nurturing environments, and the quality of
basic education (World Bank 2010a).
Skills not only matter for economy-wide productivity but also individual labor market
outcomes. Differences in labor force participation rates between those with tertiary
education and those with less than upper secondary education range from about 8 per-
centage points in Iceland to 28 percentage points in Turkey (Figure 7). In other words,
in Turkey the higher educated are 28 percent more likely to participate than those with
lower education. In Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, the share of the Roma working-age
population with at least some secondary education is 60 percentage points lower than that
of the non-Roma. In some countries, the Roma could be a quarter of potential new labor
market entrance in the near future. Helping them and other excluded groups—like ethnic
minorities or first and second generation immigrants—become more productive is not only
a matter of social inclusion; it could also increase economic growth (World Bank 2010b).
Firm surveys show that skills shortages have in recent years become increasingly


































0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Figure 7 More educated people participate more in the labor market. (percentage-point difference in
labor force participation rates between those with tertiary education and those with less than upper
secondary education, 2010). Source: World Bank estimates, based on Eurostat (2011).
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the enterprise surveys across all countries in Eastern Europe, behind only tax rates
(World Bank 2010a). On average, 30 percent of firms considered education and skills
to be a major or severe constraint in 2008. Upwards of 40 percent of firms were dissat-
isfied with the availability of skilled workers in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Ukraine. These surveys have found that in addition to technical skills,
the lack of noncognitive generic skills appears especially binding (World Bank 2009,
2010a). Also in OECD countries and some middle-income countries, noncognitive
skills are as important as cognitive and technical skills in firms’ hiring decisions6.
Despite overall success in increasing student enrollment, the quality of education needs
to be improved. The picture of education quality in Europe is diverse. Outcomes—as mea-
sured by the Program for International Student Assessment—appear particularly poor in
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Romania, which have students in early grades that
underperform relative to the country’s level of development (Figure 8). For another group
of countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, and FYR Macedonia), the performance in
cognitive tests worsened between 2006 and 2009. Worrisome for labor market outcomes,
upper secondary and tertiary education students may be graduating with the wrong skill
sets (World Bank 2010a). There is evidence that after the transition, the obsolescence of
technical skills was not addressed and that vocational education systems have not per-
formed well. As a result, employers today often assert that it is difficult to find graduates
with adequate technical skills.
Effective policy interventions can address many of these problems. Interventions
should focus on overcoming failures in information and quality assurance. Countries
should also rethink their training and education systems to avoid specialization in nar-
row (technical) fields too early in a student’s career. The dual apprenticeship systems of
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland are often cited as a role model to combine voca-
tional education with employer-driven on-the-job learning, resulting in the creation of
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Figure 8 Cognitive skills are adequate in Europe, but some countries are lagging. (reading competency
of 15-year-olds on the PISA 2009 by income levels of countries). Note: The figure shows a log-linear regression
line representing countries’ predicted Program for International Student Assessment reading scores based on
their GDP per capita. The blue line is the OECD mean reading score. Source: World Bank 2011.
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ranging from social protection and employment protection to production regulations have
to be mutually reinforcing. And although these systems might work well in highly special-
ized manufacturing, they might work less well in the relative low-skilled service sector.
Countries should also ensure that preschool and basic education curricula and pedagogic
practice pay adequate attention to the development of cognitive and noncognitive skills.3 Making jobs contestable
The main rationale for the government’s role in the labor market is to protect workers
from a lack of competition among employers for their labor and human capital. Yet
many of the prevailing models of policy intervention are from a time in Europe’s history
when large-scale manufacturing dominated economies and a few (and in some places
even single) employers could set the price of labor and manage their human resources
with impunity. Images come to mind of the abuses in Victorian-era Britain, where
workers toiled for 14-hour shifts and could be dismissed at the employer’s whim. The bal-
ance of information and power between those who seek jobs and those who offer them
has shifted considerably in the decades since. And along with this shift, the changing eco-
nomic structure of most European countries—away from large-scale industry toward var-
ied services—has made the labor market more “atomistic”. As more services become
tradable, it is harder for employers and workers to avoid competition.
Labor market policies in Europe have not kept up with these changes. The policies
prevalent in much of Europe—and parts of the world that Europeans trade and com-
pete with—make its labor markets more difficult to contest, especially for new, younger
entrants. This lack of contestability may discourage some from entering the labor mar-
ket, impede the efforts of others to match up with employers who could most benefit
from their skills and attitudes, and increase the incidence and duration of unemploy-
ment. Recent evidence shows that in countries where the labor market is less contest-
able—especially due to restrictions on dismissal—individuals and firms are more likely
to take their activities into the shadows of unregulated and untaxed markets, depriving
the state and society of public goods and holding back economies from fulfilling their
growth potential (Hazans 2011; Packard et al. 2012).
Does it matter if Europe’s labor markets are less contestable? The broad divergence
in the speed that employment is recovering in the wake of the global financial crisis
and recession suggests that it does. In countries that forgo the macroeconomic shock-
absorber offered by a flexible exchange rate (that is, all current euro area members and
those preparing to join by tying their currencies to the euro), the impact of a sudden
fall in demand on the product and labor markets can be mitigated if wages are allowed
to fall, hours are flexible, and workers at the margin can be dismissed.
When examining the relationship between labor market structures and outcomes, it is
helpful to distinguish between regulations, interventions, and institutions. Regulations set
work’s legal parameters, in the form of a minimum wage and/or restrictions on dismissal.
The state deploys interventions to correct market failures, such as the inability of private
financial markets to viably insure the risk of unemployment (unemployment insurance)
and differences in how much information employers and job seekers have (job-seeking as-
sistance). Institutions are the structures and agreed procedures for exerting influence and
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legal code of most countries for collective bargaining through labor unions.
3.1 Hiring and firing workers is too costly
A legislated minimum wage or other nonmarket floor on salaries increases labor costs for
firms and can dissuade them from offering employment to workers whose marginal prod-
uctivity does not exceed the minimum. This effect will be stronger for workers with lower
productivity, especially younger, unskilled, less experienced workers (Montenegro and Pagés
2005). Priced out of jobs on the formal (regulated and taxed) market for labor, they can join
those genuinely unemployed, take an informal (unregulated and untaxed) job, or pretend to
look for a job while working informally. But a minimum wage might also motivate workers
to increase productivity in the “efficient wages” framework, or persuade job seekers and
some outside the labor market to hold out for a job on the formal market, even if plenty of
informal employment is on offer (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995; Manning 1995).
All new members of the European Union introduced legislated minimum wages. Al-
though several older members do not have legally binding minimum wages, an effective
minimum wage is secured through the collective bargaining process in Austria, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. Generally, legislated minimum wages in the European
Union’s new members are considerably lower than the legislated or effective minimum
wages in the older member states. Over the past decade, however, these have been on a
clear upward trend. Since 2000, the minimum wage as a percentage of average wages has
risen fastest in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.
A second common set of labor laws, employment protection legislation (EPL), restricts
employers’ ability to dismiss workers—reducing flows into unemployment but also out of
it. Strict EPL can slow new employment if restrictions on dismissing workers make em-
ployers wary of hiring someone new. For this reason, restrictions on dismissal can increase
unemployment, the duration of unemployment, and the attraction of fixed-term contracts.
Past a certain threshold, it can even cause employers to turn to the untaxed, unregulated
labor market. Beyond affecting flows into and out of employment, EPL creates an “insider-
outsider” divide. Those that have a protected job (“insiders”) are relatively guarded from
losing it, while the inactive and unemployed (“outsiders”) find it more difficult to gain em-
ployment. EPL changes the distribution of jobs with important implications for first-time
job seekers, youth (especially), women, the disabled, and other disadvantaged groups.
Using the OECD’s (2004) measure of the strictness of employment protection—and its
application by Lehmann and Muravyev (2010) to non-OECD European countries—the
least restrictive conditions for employers are in Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, and the Slovak
Republic. France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain have the most restrictive regulations. In
Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Spain employment protection has
been noticeably relaxed. Partly, this relaxation has come in the form of more temporary
contracts, especially in Italy and Spain (see below). But over the same period, Hungary,
Ireland, and Poland have tightened their EPL. EPL in the European Union’s newest mem-
ber states is lower than in the older members, but there has been convergence driven both
by liberalization in parts of the west and growing restrictions among members in the east.
Lithuania and Slovenia had the most restrictive legislation, though Slovenia has liberalized
recently. Romania, by contrast, recently tightened its EPL and, after Portugal and Spain,
now has the most restrictive regulation.
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mid-1980s, several European countries, characterized by high levels of EPL, introduced
temporary contracts to increase labor market flexibility. Since then, most accessions to em-
ployment have been through fixed-term contracts. Many countries deregulated the use of
temporary contracts substantially but maintained strict protection for permanent ones.
There is substantial literature on these reforms, based largely on the Spanish experience
(Dolado et al. 2002; Bentolila et al. 2008). Because temporary contracts involve much lower
firing costs, both in severance payments and legal costs, their incidence increased signifi-
cantly. According to the European Commission (2010c), EU member states that introduced
large two-tier EPL reforms have seen an increase in temporary employment since the mid-
1980s. Countries with relatively less stringent regulations for permanent contracts—like
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—do not show any trend increase in the inci-
dence of temporary employment.
Temporary contracts affect young workers more. In most EU member states, 40 per-
cent of young people (ages 15–39) are on temporary contracts, especially among those
under 25 years of age. The share of temporary employment among workers in the 15-
to-24 age group ranges from more than 50 percent in countries like France, Germany,
Poland, Slovenia, and Spain to less than 20 percent in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and the United Kingdom.
Temporary contracts have both positive and adverse effects. They can help firms to
evaluate workers’ suitability for jobs. In that sense, temporary jobs could act as a step-
ping stone to more stable jobs. The recent debate in the literature around so-called
“single contracts” intends to develop policy proposals that strengthen this aspect of
temporary contracts. These single contracts afford higher EPL with longer tenure, leading
to a convergence to permanent contracts over time (see, for example, Blanchard and Tirole
2003; Cahuc and Kramarz 2004; García Pérez and Osuna 2011). Temporary contracts
could also act as a shock absorber, protecting firms from temporary demand fluctuations
by avoiding costly adjustments to their core labor force. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and
Boeri (2011) show that the “flexibility at the margin” provided by temporary contracts in-
creases both hiring and firing rates for newly created jobs as firms try to restrict firing costs
through reduced conversion. At the same time, a large segment of workers on temporary
contract can exasperate fluctuations in the unemployment rate during recessions, as shown
by Bentolila et al. (2012) for the case of Spain. Of course, temporary contracts can also sim-
ply be an easy way for firms to reduce labor costs, substituting temporary for permanent
workers, leading to dualistic labor markets (Layard 2005).
Overall, the experience with piecemeal reforms like the one in Spain suggests that the
two-tier EPL led to an increase in turnover, a reduction in long-term unemployment, and
greater employment. But is also is associated with a fall in investment in firm-specific
skills and a decrease in labor productivity. Temporary contracts can help make labor mar-
kets more dynamic. Two-tier EPL reforms have dramatically raised the proportion of new
recruitments of temporary contracts (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002). Bover and Gomez
(2004) found that in Spain, exit rates from unemployment into temporary contracts were
10 times larger than exit rates into permanent ones between 1987 and 1994.
The effects of EPL reforms on unemployment are also important. Using a sample of
large Spanish firms in 1993–94, Garcia-Serrano (1998) found that turnover rates varied
significantly by type of employment contract. In particular, a rise of one percentage
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employment, unemployment to employment, and employment to employment by 0.26
percentage points. Bentolila et al. (2008) found that, insofar as the use of temporary
contracts implies a rise in the hiring rate, they have helped decrease long-term un-
employment, especially in periods of high growth.
While helping to create labor market dynamism and employment, temporary con-
tracts can adversely affect productivity and investment in skills. Greater turnover and
low conversion rates can reduce incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital
(Dolado et al. 2002; Bentolila et al. 2008). Guell and Petrongolo (2007) argue that the
negative impact of temporary work on vocational training depends on whether tempor-
ary contracts are used mainly to lower wage costs or to screen for entry-level jobs.
Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) found that the share of temporary workers in Italy has a
large negative impact on firm-level productivity growth. The authors argue that rising
employment, in the aftermath of two-tier EPL reforms, led to falling labor productivity
through decreasing marginal returns for labor.
Labor market interventions—“active” labor market programs such as training and job
search assistance, and “passive” unemployment benefits such as unemployment insur-
ance and other forms of social insurance—are common in the European Union, includ-
ing the new member states. These interventions are typically financed directly through
a tax on earnings. In much of Europe, the cost of these interventions raises the cost of
labor, creating a “tax wedge” between what employers pay for work and what workers
take home (Figures 9 and 10). The largest component of the tax wedge comes as per-
sonal income tax and contributions to pensions and health insurance, but financing
these interventions also adds to labor costs. A higher tax wedge contributes to higher

































































































































Figure 9 The wedge created by income taxes and social insurance contributions is highest in Italy.
(average personal income tax and social security contributions [employer and employee] on gross labor
income, 100 percent of average wage for a person without a partner and no children). Source: World Bank
estimates, using OECD and Institute for the Study of Labor data. Note: Dark blue bars represent Western











































































































Figure 10 Labor costs have been rising quickly in the EU’s newer members. (average hourly labor costs,
calculated as cost of labor divided by hours worked). Source: World Bank estimates, using Eurostat data.
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Not only is the level of labor taxation important, but also how it progresses over income
levels. In the new member states of Eastern Europe, labor taxation tends to be high on
low-wage earners, potentially making it more difficult for them to work in the formal sec-
tor. Moreover, the wage level at which labor taxes start to increase is also fairly high, mak-
ing labor taxation less progressive in these countries (Koettl and Weber 2013).
When well-designed and administered, such programs may improve labor market
performance. Active programs that enhance skills or eliminate information asymmetries
that delay or frustrate matching in the labor market should shorten the job search
period. Active programs might lower the search and training costs of firms and indir-
ectly subsidize the creation of better jobs. Passive programs, such as unemployment
benefits, can remove the urgency of finding a new job and improve the quality of
matches. But the record of active programs is mixed at best (Card et al. 2010), and if
unemployment benefits are overly generous or poorly designed, they can lower peoples’
motivation to look for and accept a job (Holmlund 1998).
Finally, it is difficult to isolate institutions that impact only the labor market from
those that also shape other social and economic interactions. One is especially relevant:
collective bargaining as proxied by the strength of labor unions. The impact of labor
unions is felt largely through the importance of minimum wages, EPL, and active and
passive interventions already discussed (Figure 11). But strong labor unions can shape
the labor market beyond the direct impact of regulation and interventions. For ex-
ample, even where the share of the total labor force that is unionized is small, it may
be high in certain key sectors, such as public administration and the provision of essen-
tial services including education, health, and transportation. The labor code in some
countries even augments collective bargaining and the power of unions: the salaries
and benefits unions succeed in negotiating for their members can become binding for
























































































































Figure 11 In much of the European Union, membership in labor unions has been declining.
(percentage of workers who belong to a labor union, 2000 to 2007). Note: Dark blue bars represent Western
Europe, and light blue emerging European economies. Source: World Bank estimates, using OECD and
Institute for the Study of Labor data.
Gill et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 17 of 342013, 2:19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/193.2 Work is being pushed out of (regulated) markets
Taxes and regulations can create incentives for people to consume more “own-pro-
vided” services at home and for workers and employers to transact “in the shadow” on
the unregulated and untaxed market (Rosen 1997; Davis and Henrekson 2004; Packard
et al. 2012). The likelihood that they will transact informally increases where a govern-
ment’s capacity to enforce regulation is low. Conventional textbook models show how
restrictions on firing, a relatively high minimum wage, and the taxes on labor that fi-
nance active and passive assistance programs can segment insiders who benefit from
the labor code from outsiders who cannot. Less conventionally, in countries where gov-
ernments fail to provide or sustain high-quality services, employers and workers can
become disenchanted with complex labor regulation and consider taxes and compli-
ance efforts not worthwhile. There is evidence that high taxes increase nonmarket or
home production of services in Northern Europe, and they push legal market activities
into the informal market in the south (Figure 12).3.3 What helps, what hurts
Because there is no simple mapping between labor market outcomes and labor market
and social protection policies, a more rigorous analysis of the links between the two is
needed, controlling for country characteristics. Country-level data from the OECD, In-
stitute for the Study of Labor, International Labour Organization, and European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development can be used to assess how the institutions, regula-
tions, and interventions discussed above are associated with the performance of Europe’s
labor markets relative to other countries8. This approach is fraught with estimation prob-
lems, and the results should be interpreted as indicative correlations rather than causal re-



























































































Dependent employment without a contract
Informal self-employment
Unpaid family employment
Figure 12 Informal self-employment is most prevalent in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
(unregulated, untaxed work, percentage of labor force). Source: Packard et al. 2012.
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captured in that analysis. The cross-country analysis also complements microeconomic
evidence at the individual level when analyzing disincentives for formal work originating
in the tax and benefit system, as discussed in the subsection on work disincentives (Koettl
and Weber 2013).
Fialová (2011) examines the impact of regulation, interventions, and institutions on three
indicators of labor market performance: the activity rate (AR); employment rate (ER); and
the unemployment rate (UR)10. This is done for three sets of countries: the European
Union and other OECD members11, the European Union12, and EU new member states,
accession countries, and others in the European neighborhood (Figures 13, 14 and 15)13.
With regard to employment protection, stricter EPL is mostly associated with lower

































Figure 13 In Europe, active labor programs are associated with higher participation rates.
(percentage-point change in the working-age population working or searching for a job: estimated impact
of a unit change in statistically significant explanatory variables). Note: Only coefficients significant at the 1





































Figure 14 Rigid employment protection legislation is associated with lower employment rates.
(percentage employment rate: estimated impact of a unit change in statistically significant explanatory
variables). Note: Only coefficients significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels are shown in the figure.
Source: Fialová (2011).
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tion of the new member states—and positively correlated with unemployment rates, though
the latter result is less robust. High labor taxation, associated with long-term unemploy-
ment, appears to be a major problem in Europe. Overall, the strictness of EPL and high





























Figure 15 Rigid laws and high taxes are associated with higher unemployment rates. (percentage-point
change in unemployment: estimated impact of a unit change in statistically significant explanatory variables).
Note: Only coefficients significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels are shown. Source: Fialová (2011).
Gill et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 20 of 342013, 2:19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/19Minimum wages are also negatively correlated with participation rates. This appears
counterintuitive: the prospect of a higher wage should entice people into the market,
not keep them out. But workers priced out of jobs as a result of minimum wages might
be discouraged from further participating in the labor market—especially younger
people and women. The minimum wage is also associated with higher unemployment
rates—especially long-term unemployment rates—and lower employment rates.
Unionization is positively associated with participation in the labor market and em-
ployment rates, and seems to reduce long-term unemployment (in the European
Union). Spending on active labor market programs is associated with higher rates of
participation, lower unemployment rates, and higher employment rates. The relationship
between the generosity of passive labor market programs and labor market outcomes ap-
pears more complex: while generosity tends to increase participation in Europe, it appears
to have the opposite effect in non-European OECD countries. The generosity of un-
employment benefits is also associated with lower unemployment and higher employment
in Europe14.
When it comes to untaxed and unregulated work in the “shadow economy,” Packard
et al. (2012) found that when taking a country’s development into account, EPL is asso-
ciated with larger shares of shadow economy in GDP and greater labor informality. In
the southern members of the European Union, where EPL is the most restrictive, all
but the highest educated new entrants to the labor market are restricted to part-time
and informal work.
The need to keep EPL sensible is at the core of Denmark’s “flexicurity” model, which
shifts protection away from jobs to the incomes of people who lose employment with
efforts to get them back to work through training, job-search assistance, and help with
starting businesses. These “active” intervention measures seem to improve performance
and lower informal employment in OECD-member countries and Northern and Western
EU member countries. Active programs also lower informal self-employment (Packard
et al. 2012).
Germany has been getting attention for its attempts to liberalize a section of its labor
market and to motivate people with strong incentives to remain idle (Zimmermann
2006; Goethe Institut 2007; and Grabka and Goebel 2011). Although Germany’s ap-
proach may be all that can realistically be achieved given the controversial nature of
labor market reform, it has raised questions of the sustainability and welfare of what
could be a working “underclass” in jobs with less protection and even lower wages.
Germany experienced high unemployment rates of almost 10 percent between 1993
and 2004. By contrast, U.S. unemployment was about 5 percent. By 2004, almost 4.5
million Germans were unemployed according to the Federal Labor Agency. Less-skilled
and older workers had higher unemployment rates; vocational school graduates and
high school dropouts had unemployment rates of about 18 percent. In February 2002,
the so-called Hartz commission suggested ways to modernize the labor market: improve
employment services and active labor market programs, reform unemployment and social
assistance benefit programs, and foster employment by deregulating the labor market.
The reforms were implemented between 2003 and 2005. They modernized public
employment services and social welfare centers, modified existing active labor programs,
and introduced new active labor programs. The reforms changed the institutional and
legal framework for the rights and responsibilities of the unemployed and the beneficiaries
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Public employment services and social welfare centers adopted results-based accountabil-
ity and outsourced services through competition between public and private providers.
Employment offices were (partly) merged with social welfare units and converted into
centers that provided job search assistance, social services, and benefit payments. Un-
employment and social benefit levels and duration were reduced. Eligibility for subsistence
allowances were changed according to a person’s ability to work rather than previous his-
tory of contributions. Benefits were cut if recipients did not meet their responsibilities.
Wage subsidies and start-up grants were provided to entrepreneurs. Jobs with reduced so-
cial security contributions were introduced (“midi-jobs”), and the regulations for jobs ex-
empt from such contributions were reformed (“mini-jobs”). The objective was to lower
the cost of hiring low skilled workers.
Between January and October 2006, the number of claimants in jobs requiring social
insurance contributions rose 47 percent. The number of claimants working part-time
grew 30 percent, and the number in marginal employment rose 14 percent. Workers who
had survived on low wages without income support could now supplement their incomes
with benefits. The reform of temporary work regulations increased employment in fixed-
term jobs after the reform. But evaluations have found limited impact on mini-jobs.
The Hartz reforms helped reduce unemployment. Despite the crisis, Germany’s un-
employment rate today is about 7.5 percent, lower than the U.S. rate of more than 9.5
percent. Several authors have found that the reforms have significantly contributed to
the resilience of the German labor market during the Great recession (Caliendo and
Hogenacker 2012; Rinne and Zimmermann 2012). Many of the newly introduced part-
time and temporary jobs have served as a bridge to regular jobs. But the reforms might
also have reduced the income of low-wage earners, which has declined 16–22 percent
over the last decade. Net real monthly income of workers in mini-jobs declined from
€270 in 2000 to €211 in 2010, while income of workers in midi-jobs declined from €835
to €705. This is mainly due to an increase in the number of people in temporary work
and part-time jobs.
The reforms raise several questions. First, given the difficulty of comprehensive labor
reforms, does a partial liberalization targeted at some groups or sectors work? Second,
do allowances in the labor code for more flexible forms of employment lead to a “two-tier”
market and a legally sanctioned underclass? Third, do flexible and temporary forms of em-
ployment serve as a step toward advancement, or are people who enter through a midi- or
mini-job experience scarred in ways that limit their future options? Germany’s experience
appears to be promising, but these doubts will be raised in countries that try to adopt
strategies similar to the one proposed by the Hartz Commission.
4 Labor mobility—a freedom forgone
There are many reasons why labor mobility matters for productivity and growth. A
country with a more mobile labor force uses available resources more effectively and is
more likely to better match its human capital to other factors—both those that are
more fluid such as capital, and those that do not move at all such as land. Recent work
indicates that labor mobility is critical for social cohesion and the improvement of welfare
in lagging regions15. When people move, they create links between places where economic
activity is densely concentrated and those where it is not. These links become channels for
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tances, that sustain the welfare of family members left behind and lead to investments in
locally appropriate enterprises. Through these channels, increased labor mobility also con-
tributes to economic convergence within countries, between leading and lagging regions,
but also between countries, helping the new member states to achieve the living standards
of the older member states. A mobile labor force can better adjust to shocks, and recover
more quickly. Given its demographic outlook and the decline in the working-age popula-
tion, increased labor mobility will be needed in Europe. And there is a lot of room for it.
4.1 Europeans are less mobile
The European Union is the most integrated region in the world, and accordingly, mi-
gration between EU countries is higher than in other world regions. Europe’s aspiration,
however, is more ambitious: a fully integrated labor market with no borders. Against
this yardstick, Europe still falls short. By most measures, these differences are particu-
larly great between the European Union and the United States (Eurofound 2007a,b,c,
using Eurobarometer data 2005; Figure 16). In the former EU15, prior to enlargement
in 2004 and 2007, only about 1 percent of the working-age population changed its country
of residence in a given year. By contrast, until recently about 3 percent of the working-age
population in the United States moved to a different state in a given year. In Australia, this
figure is 2 percent; in Canada, slightly less than 2 percent. Even in Russia, with its history
of outright restrictions on peoples’ movement, mobility is 1.7 percent.
With a common language and fewer institutional differences, people in Australia, Canada,
and the United States can move with greater ease than Europeans. Measures of movement
between territories (at the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 2 level) within
EU countries change the picture considerably: about 21 percent of the EU population has
lived in a territory or country other than where they were born. But even by this measure,
labor mobility is still below that of the United States, where 32 percent of the population
lives outside the state they were born in16. About 2 percent of the EU labor force was born
in a member state different than their current state of residence; approximately 4 percent
of the EU population has lived in another EU country at some point in their life; and 3
percent has lived in a country outside the European Union (Eurofound 2007a,b,c).
Internal mobility is difficult to compare across countries because its measurement de-
pends on the size of the measurement unit. If the measurement unit is small—for example,
the municipality—the corresponding internal migration rate will be high, because many
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Figure 16 Europeans are less mobile within countries. Source: Eurofound 2007a,b,c.
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migration rate controls for the size of administrative units. The exercise reveals that many
European countries, especially the transition economies, have low labor mobility (World
Bank 2012).
But lower labor mobility within a single market could reflect the smaller size of coun-
tries and shorter distances between centers of economic activity. Why move when you
can commute? In a 2008 report on labor mobility in Europe, the Institute for the Study of
Labor adopted a broad definition of geographic mobility that included not only changes
of residency within countries and across borders but also cross-border and regional com-
muting (Bonin et al. 2008, using the European Labor Force Survey). The report showed
that between 2000 and 2005, workers’ mobility within the European Union was barely 1
percent each year and that the movement of people in Europe was lower than mobility
across Australian (2 percent) and U.S. states (3 percent).
The report also showed that in the EU15, the share of the active working-age, foreign-
born population from an EU27 country increased during the previous decade. Spain had
the largest increase, followed by Greece, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, and Austria. Among the newer member states, those with the highest initial
share of foreign-born people (Latvia and Estonia) showed a decline over time. In most
EU15 countries, foreign nationals from another EU15 country comprise only a small share
of foreign nationals. An exception can be found in the United Kingdom: The largest non-
native resident minority group in London is from France.
These statistics present a paradox. The movement of people within the European
Union is one of the Four Freedoms, and probably the one that comes most immediately
to the average European’s mind when asked why the European Union is important. Yet,
the Eurobarometer survey in 2005 showed that lifetime mobility of European citizens
across EU borders is rather limited (Table 1). In most EU countries, less than 5 percent
of the population have ever moved from one EU country to another.
This may be changing. The same survey showed that mobile Europeans are younger
and have higher levels of education than those who have no intention of moving. Students
in Europe are among the most mobile, enthusiastically taking advantage of such cross-
border education programs as Erasmus. For many, these programs lead to longer term re-
settlement for employment. Parey and Waldinger (2011) find that studying abroad with
ERASMUS increases an individual's probability of working in a foreign country by about
15 percentage points. Indeed, recent statistics show an increase in mobility. In 2008, about
2.3 percent of EU citizens (11.3 million people) resided in a member state other than their
citizen state, according to the European Commission17. That number has grown more
than 40 percent since 2001.
A lack of movement is often blamed for high unemployment rates in areas that lag
and for labor shortages that drive up wages in places that lead. This negative correl-
ation between mobility and unemployment is apparent in data from selected OECD
countries for 1980 to 1995 (Hassler et al. 2001; Figure 17). Labor markets can re-
spond differently to shocks, often resulting in differences in the impact on jobs
across areas. Adjustment to regional shocks in Europe has been achieved more
through unemployment rates and changes in labor force participation (people stop
looking for work if a region goes into economic decay) and less through mobility of
labor18. By contrast, in the United States, labor mobility leads to greater agility in
Table 1 Internationally, the Irish are the most mobile Europeans in the single market
Local move Move in country Move inside the European Union
Ireland 44.5 18.8 14.5
Luxembourg 53.8 19.4 13.2
Cyprus 47.8 17.2 8.1
Denmark 62.6 36.2 7.5
Sweden 65.9 41.8 7.1
United Kingdoma 52.3 23.7 6.6
Finland 64.5 34.7 5.1
Germany 59.4 18.1 4.9
Belgium 59.6 13.0 4.5
Spain 46.6 9.9 4.5
Greece 34.7 16.4 4.4
Netherlands 55.0 21.6 4.4
Portugal 41.7 8.6 4.2
Austria 54.1 9.4 3.4
Malta 27.6 6.2 2.7
France 58.2 28.8 2.6
Latvia 44.2 22.5 2.0
Czech Republic 41.9 8.2 1.6
Italy 43.8 7.9 1.6
Slovenia 38.2 9.6 1.6
Slovak Republic 34.2 5.8 1.4
Estonia 50.5 23.4 1.1
Poland 40.6 7.1 1.0
Hungary 47.5 9.9 0.7
Latvia 57.4 7.4 0.7
a. Includes Northern Ireland.
Note: Weighted averages. Multiple answers allowed.
Source: Bonin et al. 2008.
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Figure 17 Low labor mobility can keep unemployment high. (labor mobility and unemployment rates
in the nine largest OECD countries, 1980–95). Source: Hassler et al. 2001. (labor mobility and unemployment
rates in EU member states, 1995–2006). Source: World Bank staff, based on Eurostat data.
Gill et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 24 of 342013, 2:19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/19
Gill et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 25 of 342013, 2:19
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/19responding to differences in wages and job opportunities across states, reducing dispar-
ities in unemployment rates and real wages.
But does a mobile labor force really make much of a difference for a country’s economic
prospects? Policymakers are aware of statistics showing the relative immobility of Europeans
and are eager to know what they can do about it. The phased withdrawal of restrictions on
the movement of people from the newest member states of the European Union has been an
obvious obstacle that will disappear in time. Yet people from the newer member states still
face explicit barriers to mobility within the European Union19. Lessons from how different
EU15 members have managed this aspect of enlargement are still being absorbed, but evi-
dence from movements since 2004 and in reaction to the crisis indicate that the member
states that embraced newcomers from the newest member countries benefited. Kahanec and
Zimmermann (2009), for example, find substantial long-term positive impacts on GDP, GDP
per capita, productivity and wages in the EU15 countries from post-enlargement immigration.
Looking beyond adjustment to shocks and recovery from the recession, growing literature
provides evidence that internal labor mobility tends to have positive effects on countries’
productivity and growth. For example, without mobile labor, the growth rate of the United
States would likely have been only half of what it actually has been (World Bank 2009). In
Canada, the movement of people across provinces contributed to economic growth (Sharpe
et al. 2007). Due to the high volume of movement from low-productivity eastern provinces
to high-productivity western provinces, Canada benefited from a huge boost to economic
growth in 2006.
Further, countries with higher labor mobility have better performing labor markets and
higher rates of employment. For instance, the three European countries that have reached
the Lisbon employment targets—the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—all
have labor mobility rates in the top quartile (Figure 18). Conversely, countries with the
highest dispersion in employment rates across their territories (Italy, Spain, Hungary, and
the Slovak Republic) have mobility rates below the European average20.
Researchers have been trying to identify the impediments to mobility in economic areas
where labor is legally free to move. Language and cultural barriers obviously play a role
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Figure 18 Greater labor mobility is associated with higher rates of employment in Europe.
(correlation between labor mobility rate [average 1996–2006, horizontal axis] and employment rate [average
1996–2006, vertical axis], selected European countries: coefficient 0.677). Note: Labor mobility is the share of
the population that moved from one region (Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics 2) to another
within a given year. Source: World Bank estimates, using Eurostat data.
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termine social insurance coverage, the accrual of occupational pension rights, entitlements to
social housing and other forms of assistance, and the recognition of their professional qualifi-
cations and previous work experience. Perhaps reflecting the current tough times, as in
Europe, local chambers of commerce and professional guilds of U.S. trade associations are
starting to erect barriers—even to people offering their services online—in order to restrict
movement and thus competition. This strict “rule of license” is an obstacle to movement and
faster labor market adjustment. These impediments may be more serious for prime-aged
workers than for the young or the retired. As the median age of Europeans increases from
40 years today to nearly 50 by 2050, the mobility imperative will become more pressing.4.2 What keeps Europeans at home
Among the strongest deterrents to greater mobility in Europe are those created by failures
in housing markets (Figure 19). In many European countries, housing is a good that is still
exchanged informally on unregulated or poorly regulated markets (Janiak and Wasmer
2008). Rental markets are shallow, rent is expensive, and supply is limited by zoning re-
strictions. These problems constrain people’s mobility at both their origin and destination:
moving can be a costly prospect, made more so by difficulties selling or renting one’s
house. Bottlenecks in the housing market are a serious impediment to mobility. Home-
owners in Europe are more sluggish to move in response to changing labor market condi-
tions than people who rent their homes (Hughes and McCormick 1985, 1987; Henley
1998; Gardner et al. 2001). The relatively high unemployment rates in some European
countries can be explained in part by a large portion of people who are owner-occupiers
(Haavio and Kauppi 2003). The constraints to labor mobility created by failures in the hous-
ing market have been documented elsewhere (Mansoor and Quillin 2006) and create
powerful deterrents to movement even in countries on the European Union’s doorstep.
Another likely culprit preventing Europeans from moving is the relative rigidity of
wages and generous pay-out periods of unemployment insurance plans. Wage regula-
tion leads to an earnings compression that can mute the signals that the labor market
sends from one part of a country to another. If wages are not sufficiently flexible, they
can fail to provide incentives for capital to flow into economically lagging regions or0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45









Miss support from family or friends
Miss direct contact with family or friends
Figure 19 Language, housing, and health care are the main impediments to mobility. (factors that
deter people from moving to another EU country [percent]). Note: Figures are for respondents from the
EU25 who do not intend to move. Source: Karppinen et al. 2006.
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ance plans that provide support over long periods can act as a disincentive for workers
with industry-specific or place-specific skills to retrain and move. In principle, the rela-
tionship could also be reverse in the sense that more generous unemployment benefits
can give job seekers the resources and time to look for better matching job offers in
other regions. Yet, as Hassler et al. (2001) show, on average there seems to be a nega-
tive relationship between mobility rates and unemployment insurance: high-mobility
countries are characterized by low unemployment insurance benefits, while low-
mobility countries have the most generous unemployment insurance plans.
Higher structural unemployment in many European countries also deters the movement
of labor. Although differences in unemployment rates between the lagging and leading
parts of a country should encourage movement, a high overall national unemployment
rate will discourage people from taking the risk. Unemployed workers will probably not
want to pay the cost of moving to more dynamic parts of their country if they would still
face the high likelihood of not finding a job21.
The lack of portable social benefits—such as pensions, health care, and social assist-
ance—might also constrain the mobility of labor between EU countries. EU legislation
grants portability of such benefits at a level not found in any other region of the world.
In principle, the most important benefits (for example, public pension and health benefits)
are fully portable within the European Union and, to some extent, with countries outside
the European Union. Nevertheless, important challenges remain22. First, the administration
of portability can be burdensome for intra-EU migrants. For example, old-age pensions are
not paid as a single benefit, but by each pension insurance fund separately. The determin-
ation of separate pensions, taking into account contribution periods from different member
states, is complex and opaque. Second, legislation on portability does not apply to occupa-
tional benefits, so moving might lead to considerable losses. Third, social assistance bene-
fits are excluded from portability; the lack of a Europe-wide social safety net could also act
as a barrier to intra-EU mobility.
Finally, some EU policies may inadvertently be keeping Europeans immobile. The free
flow of trade in goods and foreign direct investment across the single market might re-
duce the need for labor to move. Trade flows react more elastically than people, and
capital is far more mobile. Trade in goods—particularly intermediate goods—along with
capital transfers could make the movement of labor to other economic areas less im-
portant. This is a “good reason” for lower labor mobility in Europe, especially in the
European Union. But other policies may not be so benign. European agriculture and
cohesion policies and investments from regional and structural funds could be creating
disincentives for mobility. Regional development policy instruments pour investment
into economically lagging areas, sometimes with the stated objective of fostering job
creation to retain young and qualified workers. Although the track record of these policies
is mixed at best, to the extent that they deter movement of people at the margin, they ob-
viate the need for European workers to move to where persistent vacancies arise.5 Conclusions
If current trends persist, members of the European Union, the EFTA countries, the candi-
date countries, and the eastern European partnership countries will lose almost 50 million
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tive job seekers—consists of 323 million people; in 50 years, it will be down to 273 million,
a decrease of 15.3 percent. Over the next 20 years, the labor force will lose 15 million
workers. The largest reduction will happen during the 2030s, when the European labor
force is expected to fall an additional 14 million people. The fall will be especially severe
for the European Union and EFTA countries. Their labor force will decrease by almost 40
million people (18 percent) over the next 50 years. The other eastern European countries
will not fare much better, with an equally steep decline of 16 percent.
These trends should not be allowed to persist. Many Europeans—especially women,
youth, elderly, and some minorities—do not work at all, and they should. Many Europeans
retire too early, and they should work longer. Some unemployed Europeans do not look
hard enough for work, and they should be encouraged to look harder. Only with radical
policy and behavioral changes can Europe counter the shrinking labor force. Yet, even
under such optimistic conditions, Europe will not be able to prevent its labor force from
aging. If participation rates in all countries were to converge to those in northern Europe, or
the retirement age were to increase by 10 years across the board, the European labor force
would actually increase by 2060. If female labor force participation were to converge to that
of men, the labor force would still decrease, but only by 5 percent, as opposed to 15 percent
in the baseline scenario. None of these scenarios counteracts, however, the loss of young
workers due to continually decreasing younger-age cohorts. Thus, as argued in Golden
Growth, increased migration will also have to be part of the solution. With revamped immi-
gration policies that combine the altruism of humanitarian policies with the self-interest of
an economic approach, Europe can attract bright Africans, Americans, and Asians.
Revisiting the questions posed at the beginning of the paper may be useful.
Are employment and social protection practices reducing participation? In most coun-
tries, they do, and reforming these policies can stem some if not most of the projected
decline of the European labor force, especially by increasing participation rates of older
workers and women. Yet, in addition to immigration, increased investments in human
capital are also necessary to not only have more, but also more productive workers. Inter-
ventions should focus on overcoming failures in information and quality assurance that
lead many people to make suboptimal skills investments (too few engineers, technicians,
and competent managers). Countries in emerging Europe have to reorganize their school
networks in the face of shrinking student cohorts, and pay more attention to developing
critical cognitive and non-cognitive skills during preschool and basic education.
Are employment and social protection practices inhibiting efficiency? Yes, by creating
influential insiders with well-protected jobs at the cost of marginalizing others. The re-
forms will have to reduce job security while modernizing the systems for providing income
security. In wealthier countries, reduced employment protection can be combined with
relatively generous unemployment benefits and social assistance. Governments capable of
administering programs that supplement employment protection laws with well-designed
income support and job search assistance should institute them. But to work well, this
“flexicurity” requires high labor force participation rates that are many years away for
many in Europe, as well as an institutional maturity and fiscal and administrative resources
that are out of reach for most. Especially in the east and south but perhaps also in other
countries, there may be no alternative but to reconsider the extent of employment protec-
tion and the generosity of social protection. But all countries should synchronize social
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centives for work, as Germany did between 2003 and 2005.
Is Europe taking advantage of the potential for greater labor mobility? Not fully. Un-
doubtedly, the European Union is the most integrated region in the world, and migra-
tion between EU countries is higher than in other world regions. Europe’s aspiration is,
however, more ambitious: the aim is a fully integrated labor market with no borders.
Against this yardstick, Europe still falls short. Significant challenges to improving labor
mobility, even within European countries, remain. Mobility does come with social costs—
missing the support of family and friends—that governments cannot easily reduce. But
the costs related to education, housing, and health care can and should be reduced. These
are some of the features that make the United States the most mobile economy in the
world, and Europe can learn without losing its uniqueness.
Looking back at the last decade and a half, emerging Europe may have done better
than advanced Europe in taking advantage of expanding opportunities for trade, fi-
nance, and enterprise. Looking ahead, the prospects are bleaker. Demographic shifts
threaten Central and Eastern Europe just as much as most countries in Western Europe.
The exception is Southern Europe, which has not done well in recent years and is pro-
jected to shrink and age over the next decade. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain illustrate
most starkly how work is simultaneously the weakest part of the European economic
model and one of its most attractive attributes. Changing how the labor market is regu-
lated and replenished will be difficult for politicians, but it is nonetheless urgent. Nor is it
hopeless: countries such as Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden have shown that the
European work model’s characteristics can be changed while keeping its character dis-
tinctly European.
This paper is perhaps best concluded with a simple (but uncomfortable) answer to the
principal question it addresses: Can Europe attain full employment? The answer is yes,
but not until the continent is willing to make radical changes in its approach to work. A
central aspect is that most countries in Europe give disproportionate power to those with
protected jobs —the “insiders”— through employment protection legislation. This ap-
proach would have become difficult to sustain even without the onset of rapid aging. With
this shift, it is already unsustainable. Countries such as Denmark and Germany—but also
other Nordic countries, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—which have kept un-
employment low and labor force participation high during the last decade, have done so
in some measure by reducing this protection. In effect, they have made jobs contestable.
Now others must do the same.Endnotes
1In the chapter on labor in Gill and Raiser (2012), on which this paper is based, we
discuss a wider range of constraints on employment outcomes, from regulation to im-
migration. For the sake of brevity, we have reduced the scope of discussion in this
paper to just ‘within market’ factors. Readers are referred to Gill and Raiser (2012) for
the full treatment including of immigration policies.
2This projection assumes that overall immigration and participation rates by sex and
age group remain at current levels.
3For a more detailed discussion on incentivizing formal work, see World Bank (2011a).
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tionship between economic growth and school attainment.
5See Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for U.S evidence, Brunello and Schlotter (2011) for
Europe, and World Bank (2011a) for summary evidence in middle-income countries.
6See, for example, Bowles and Gintis (1998) for evidence of employer surveys from
the United Kingdom and the United States, Blom and Saeki (2011) for a study for India,
and World Bank (2011b) for evidence from Latin America.
7For an extensive treatment of the impact of labor unions on labor-market outcomes
in Europe, see Alesina et al. (2005).
8Following Fialová and Schneider (2009, 2011), we use two-stage least squares regres-
sion estimation with instrumental variables on pooled data. Standard panel estimation
procedures (random or fixed effects estimation) were not employed for insufficient ex-
planatory power of these models and/or too few data. Data were mainly from OECD
with some supplements from the Institute for the Study of Labor, International Labour
Organization, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
9The findings correspond with previous empirical studies using similar techniques by
Cazes and Nesporova (2003) and Nickell (1997). With respect to long-term unemploy-
ment, employment protection legislation was generally found to be insignificant across
country samples. Active labor market policy spending was also insignificant.
10For detailed descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the regressions, see
Fialová and Schneider (2009, 2011) and Fialová (2011). Over the whole sample of coun-
tries, the average for active labor market policy expenditure was 10.1 percent of GDP, the
average implicit tax rate on labor was 35.1 percent, the average EPL index was 2.3, the
average minimum wage as a share of average earnings was 40.3 percent, and average trade
union density was 35.6 percent.
11The data are from the OECD, for 2001–07. The sample covers Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Of them, 17 are classified as EU OECD and 7 as non-EU OECD.
12The sample covers Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Of them, 15 are classified as old European Union and 3
as new member states of the European Union.
13Data are from the Institute for the Study of Labor database, for 1999, 2003, and 2007.
The sample covers Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, and Ukraine. Of them, 9 are classified as new member states of the European
Union and 6 as European neighborhood.
14The generosity of unemployment benefits seems to have the reverse effect in non-
European OECD countries.
15Bertola and Ichino (1995) argue that the persistence of unemployment in Europe in
the 1980s and 1990s was caused by a lack of labor mobility and people remaining in
lagging areas.
16However, Eurofound (2007a,b,c) presents data that indicate a decrease in interstate
mobility in the United States over 2000–05.
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nonnationals in EU27 countries were citizens of another member state. The number of
nonnationals in EU27 has increased 42 percent since 2001 (for further details, see
Eurostat Statistics in focus 94/2009).
18Tatsiramos (2007) makes reference to important work by Decressin and Fatas (1995)
and Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) about European trends. For the United States, Tatsiramos
quotes Blanchard and Katz (1992).
19Restrictions on the freedom to work can be maintained for up to seven years after
the entry of new member states into the European Union. The last restrictions were
lifted on workers from the EU8 countries in May 2011. Restrictions will be lifted on
workers from Bulgaria and Romania in December 2013.
20Using Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics 2 data.
21See, for instance, Bentolila (1997) for Spain; Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) for
the United Kingdom; and Fidrmuc (2004) for transition economies.
22For a detailed discussion on conceptual issues regarding portability of social bene-
fits, see Holzmann and Koettl (2011).
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